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21 Introduction
Tweakable Block Ciphers. Tweakable block ciphers generalize the notion
of block cipher by allowing an (eventually public) additional parameter t ∈ T
which is called a tweak. This new parameter has been introduced to bring an
inherent variability to the encryption, like an IV or a nonce for a mode of
operation. The relevant definitions and security notions have first been formally
defined in a paper by Liskov, Rivest and Wagner [27]. Informally, a tweakable
block cipher should be indistinguishable from a random tweakable permutation,
i.e. a family of permutations indexed by T . This primitive has since then been
shown to be useful for several applications like length preserving modes of
operations [18,19], online encryption [45,1], authenticated encryption [27,44,
43] and full disk encryption. A few natively tweakable block ciphers already
exist, like the Hasty Pudding Cipher [47], Mercy [12], or Threefish (which is used
in the Skein [15] hash function). Jean et al. [22] also defined the TWEAKEY
framework, which can be used to create tweakable block ciphers from scratch.
Generic Constructions from Block Ciphers. Tweakable block ciphers
can be built generically from standard block ciphers, and this is the approach
we follow in this work. Several such constructions can already be found in the
literature. These constructions often rely on an ε−AXU family of functions, i.e.
a family of keyed functions satisfying the following condition:
∀t ∈ T , ∀t′ ∈ T \ {t}, ∀y ∈ {0, 1}n, Pr [h←$ H : h(t)⊕ h(t′) = y] ≤ ε.
Let us fix a block cipher E with key space K and message space {0, 1}n and a
ε−AXU family of hash functions H from a set T to {0, 1}n. In their seminal
paper, Liskov et al. [27] already proposed two different generic constructions
and got a proof of security up to the birthday bound. These constructions are
defined as follows. For each t ∈ T , k ∈ {0, 1}n, m ∈ {0, 1}n and h ∈ H, one has
LRW1k(t,m) =Ek(t⊕ Ek(m)),
LRW2h,k(t,m) =h(t)⊕ Ek(m⊕ h(t)),
These constructions are very simple and thus very useful. However, their
security is limited to the birthday bound, which can make them too weak for
some applications. There exists numerous other black-box strategies to build
a tweakable block ciphers. One can cite e.g. XEX [43]and its variants [32,7]
which are linked to Liskov et al.’s first construction and suffer from the same
limitation to the birthday bound.
More recently, a few beyond-the-birthday-bound secure constructions have
been published. For example, one can remark that the LRW2 construction
can be iterated with independent keys, thus increasing the security of the
construction beyond the birthday bound and making it asymptotically grow
towards optimal security as the number of rounds grows [25,24,42]. This con-
struction is however quite inefficient if the security requirements are high.
3There also exist other constructions which are both beyond the birthday bound
secure and do not require being iterated. The first one is Minematsu’s construc-
tion [33], denoted Min, or Mennink’s constructions [29], denoted F˜ [1] and F˜ [2]
:
Mink(t,m) =E(E(k, t︸︷︷︸
θ bits
|| 0 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−θ bits
),m) for every (t, k,m) ∈ {0, 1}θ × ({0, 1}n)2
F˜ [1]k(t,m) =Ek⊕t(m⊕ k ⊗ t)⊕ k ⊗ t for every (k, t,m) ∈ ({0, 1}n)3
F˜ [2]k(t,m) =Ek⊕t(m⊕ Ek(t))⊕ Ek(t) for every (k, t,m) ∈ ({0, 1}n)3
where ⊗ denotes the product on the finite field with 2n elements, for an
arbitrary fixed irreducible polynomial. A necessary condition for the security
of Minematsu’s construction is that the number of adversarial queries has to
be small in front of 2n−θ, which means that the security of the construction
grows as the size of the tweak space shrinks. Mennink’s constructions are secure
as long as the number of queries is small in front of 22n/3, respectively 2n.
The only drawback of these two constructions is that the security proof only
holds in the ideal cipher model, as opposed to the other constructions which
are studied in the standard model1. In [49], the constructions F˜ [1] and F˜ [2]
have been completed by 32 related constructions that also achive 2n provable
security in the ideal cipher model.
Multi-User security. Unfortunately, none of the existing constructions
offering beyond the birthday bound security in the standard model can really
be considered practical. However, all these constructions were studied in the
single user setting. Yet, block ciphers are typically widely deployed and are used
with a lot of different keys. Multi-user security thus appears as a very natural
security notion. This notion was first introduced and formalized by Bellare,
Boldyreva and Micali [2] in the context of public-key encryption. Recently,
several works by Mouha and Luykx [35], Tessaro [48], Hoang and Tessaro [20]
and Luykx, Mennink and Paterson [28] study the multi-user security for block-
cipher designs. A natural question is to investigate whether it is possible to
build a secure tweakable block cipher from a multi-user secure block cipher, by
using a different key for the underlying block cipher for each different tweak.
Our contribution. In this paper, we propose a new simple method to
construct a tweakable block cipher from a block cipher. We also prove its
security in the standard model and the multi-user setting as long as the block
cipher is secure and the number of adversarial queries is small in front of
2n, where n is the size of the block. We now describe our construction. Let
n > 1 be an integer. Let E be a block cipher with key space {0, 1}2n and
message space {0, 1}n. We define the tweakable block cipher E′ with key space
{0, 1}2n, tweak space {0, 1}n−2 and message space {0, 1}n as follows. For every
(k, t,m) ∈ {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}n−2 × {0, 1}n, one has
E′(k, t,m) = E (E(k, t||0)⊕ E(k, t||1)||E(k, t||0)⊕ E(k, t||2),m) ,
1 It is still possible to study Mennink’s constructions in the standard model, however the
result will have to use the security of the underlying block cipher against some family of
related key attacks.
4where || denotes the concatenation operation and we use 2-bit encoding for
t||i, for i = 0, 1, 2. This construction requires four calls to the underlying
block cipher, while offering a tweak space only four times smaller than the
message space and enjoying a very interesting security bound. However, we
require tweak-dependent re-keying, which may prove costly in a real world
implementation.
Our security proof relies on two results. First we show how to build a
secure tweakable block cipher from a secure block cipher and a pseudo-random
function. Then we extend to the multi-user setting a result from [21] showing
that, when P is a uniformly random permutation, then x 7→ XORPwP (x) =∣∣∣∣w
i=1P (x||0)⊕ P (x||i) is indistinguishable from a uniformly random function.
As usual, this last security proof relies on Patarin’s H coefficients technique [38].
A note on the χ2 method. In [13], the authors formalized a new proof
technique named the χ2 method. They used it to provide very simple security
proofs for the (full) indistinguishability of the XORP2 construction and of the
XOR of two permutations. Unfortunately, Bhattacharya and Nandi identified
a flaw in the proofs [5]. In a subsequent article [4], Bhattacharya and Nandi
manage to prove the (full) indifferentiability of the XOR of two (or more)
independent permutations via the χ2 method. The generalization of this proof
to the XORPw construction for w ≥ 2 is still an interesting and challenging
open problem.
Related work. In [36], the author independently defines a construction that
is fairly similar to our own. They combine the XORP construction for tweak
and key deriving function with the LRW construction to get a tweakable block
cipher. However, they study it with AE in mind, in the single-user setting.
More precisely, they consider the tweak as a nonce and a counter, the nonce
being fed to the XORP construction and the counter to the XOR universal
hash function. This is made to prevent frequent rekeying of the block cipher.
With this approach, the primitive that is being studied is more a tweakable
(or rather nonce-based) mode of operation for a block cipher rather than a
generic BC-to-TBC conversion technique. On the contrary, we focus on the
conversion aspect of the construction and more specifically on the multi-user
security rather than the single-user security.
In [26], the authors prove a result which is also similar to our Theorem 2.
There are still several differences: the security of the tweakable block cipher is
considered in the single-user setting and the constructions are allowed to depend
on some idealized primitives. They also use this result in a different context
and apply it to iterated constructions (the Even-Mansour [14] and Tweakable
Even-Mansour [11] constructions and the iterated LRW [27] construction).
In [31], Mennink presents an impossibility result regarding the construction
of an optimally secure tweakable block cipher from a block cipher in the
standard model using standard proof techniques. This is deeply related to our
results and we include a discussion on the the topic of optimal security in
section 3.2.
5More related work. Another way of building a secure tweakable block
cipher is to create it “from scratch”, i.e. using a lower level idealized primitive.
The first provably secure high level structures allowing the construction of
natively tweakable block ciphers from lower-level primitives have been studied
by Goldenberg et al. [16] who considered the inclusion of a tweak in a Feistel
network. This work has then been extended to generalized Feistel networks by
Mitsuda and Iwata [34]. A similar study has been undertaken for the class of
key-alternating ciphers in a long series of articles by Cogliati and Seurin [11,10],
Cogliati, Lampe and Seurin [9], Granger et al. [17], Kurosawa [23], Mennink [30]
and Sasaki et al. [46].
2 Preliminaries
General notations. The set of binary strings of length n is denoted {0, 1}n.
For every integer n, we will sometimes denote [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Given a non-
empty set X , we denote x←$ X the uniformly random draw of x in the set
X . For any positive integer a, let Ian = ({0, 1}n)a and let Jan be the set of
tuples (x1, . . . , xa) ∈ Ian such that the xis are pairwise distinct. For any integers
1 ≤ b ≤ a, we will write (a)b = a(a−1) · · · (a−b+1) and (a)0 = 1 by convention.
The set of all functions from X to Y is denoted Func(X ,Y), and the set of all
permutations of X is denoted Perm(X ). The set of all permutations of {0, 1}n
is simply denoted Perm(n). A family of permutation of a set X indexed by a
set Y is denoted Perm(Y,X ). We will also often see a family P˜ ∈ Perm(X ,Y)
as a function P˜ : X × Y → Y such that, for each x ∈ X , P˜ (x, ·) = P˜x is a
permutation. When the set X is of the type {0, 1}n for an integer n, we will
simply write Perm(Y, n) instead of Perm(Y, {0, 1}n). A multi-user permutation
with u users and domain X is a family of permutations indexed by the set
[u]. A tweakable permutation with tweak space T is a family of permutations
indexed by the set T .
Security notions. We consider the security of our constructions in the
standard, non-idealized model, in the multi-user setting. Let K,M be two non-
empty sets and let u be the number of users. The set K will be referred to as the
set of users andM the set of messages. Each user will be assigned a uniformly
random key that will be kept secret from the adversary. This assignment will
be modeled as the uniformly random draw of a function f ∈ Func([u],K).
Let q, t be two positive integers and let E : K×M→M be a block cipher.
We write Ek(x) for E(k, x). A (u, q, t)−adversary D against the multi-user
strong PRP security (shortened to ±mPRP) of E is an algorithm with oracle
access to a multi-user permutation P ∈ Perm([u],M), making a total of at
most q adaptive and bidirectional oracle queries to at most u distinct users,
running in time at most t and outputting a single bit. The advantage of D in
6breaking the ±mPRP-security of E is defined as
Adv±mPRPE (D) =
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [f ←$ Func([u],K) : DE(f(·),·) = 1]
− Pr
[
P˜ ←$ Perm([u],M) : DP˜ = 1
] ∣∣∣∣∣.
Let E˜ : K × T ×M→M be a tweakable block cipher. We write E˜k(t, x)
for E˜(k, t, x). A (u, q, t)−adversary D against the multi-user strong TPRP
security (shortened to ±mP˜RP) of E˜ is an algorithm with oracle access to a
multi-user tweakable permutation P ∈ Perm([u]× T ,M), making a total of at
most q adaptive and bidirectional oracle queries to at most u users, running in
time at most t and outputting a single bit. The advantage of D in breaking the
±mP˜RP-security of E˜ is defined as
Adv±mP˜RP
E˜
(D) =
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [f ←$ Func([u],K) : DE˜(f(·),·,·) = 1]
− Pr
[
P˜ ←$ Perm([u]× T ,M) : DP˜ = 1
] ∣∣∣∣∣.
Let F : K × X → Y be a keyed function. We write Fk(x) for F (k, x). A
(u, q, t)−adversary D against the multi-user PRF security (shortened to mPRF)
of F is an algorithm with oracle access to a function F ∈ Func([u] × X ,Y)
making a total of at most q adaptive oracle queries to at most u users, running
in time at most t and outputting a single bit. The advantage of D in breaking
the mPRF security of F is defined as
AdvmPRFF (D) =
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [f ←$ Func([u],K) : DF (f(·),·) = 1]
− Pr [R←$ Func([u]×X ,Y) : DR = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣.
3 Rationale behind the constructions
3.1 Description of the Constructions and Summary of the Results
Let KE ,KF ,MF be non-empty sets and let n > 1 be an integer. Let F :
KF ×MF → KE be a PRF and let E : KE × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a block
cipher. As in [33], we define the tweakable block cipher TKS[E,F ] with key
space KF , tweak spaceMF and message spaceME as follows:
∀(k, t,m) ∈ KF ×MF × {0, 1}n, TKS[E,F ]k(t,m) = EFk(t)(m).
7In section 4, we prove in Theorem 2 that this construction enjoys a security
reduction in the multi-user setting to the mPRF security of F and the ±mPRP
security of E. Namely, we prove that, for any positive integers q, t, any number
of users u, and any (u, q, t)−adversary D against the ±mP˜RP security of
TKS[E,F ], there exist a (u, τ, t′)−adversary D′ against the mPRF−security
of F , where τ = min(q, u · |MF |), and a (τ, q, t′′) adversary D′′ against the
±mPRP security of E such that
Adv±mP˜RPTKS[E,F ](D) ≤AdvmPRFF (D′) +Adv±mPRPE (D′′),
where t′ = O(t+ q · tE), t′′ = t+O(q), and tE denotes an upper bound on the
time needed to compute E and E−1 on any input.
With this result in mind, it seems natural to use PRP-to-PRF conversion
methods in order to replace the PRF F by a construction based on the
block cipher E. Minematsu’s construction can be seen as a particular case
of this family of constructions, using a block cipher as a PRF. What makes
Minematsu’s construction beyond the birthday bound secure in the single user
setting is the fact that the tweak size is kept small enough2. In this case, in
the security reduction, the number of queries made to the PRF correspond
to the number of different tweaks used is certainly smaller than u · |MF |,
thus introducing a term min(q, u · |MF |)2/|ME | in the security bound. In the
multi-user setting, shrinking the tweak space will not be very helpful to prove
beyond-birthday-bound security in this new setting, as long as the number of
users is supposed to be high. Indeed, it is desirable to have a tweak space as
large as possible. In order to keep an efficient construction while being able to
prove security beyond the birthday bound, we will have to use a better PRF
than a block cipher. Namely, we will use the XORPwE construction which is
defined as follows [21]:
∀(k,m) ∈ KE×{0, 1}n−dlog2(w+1)e, XORPwE(k,m) =
∣∣∣∣w
i=1Ek(m||0)⊕Ek(m||i),
where || denotes the concatenation operation. We will also consider the trun-
cated XORP construction which we will denote XORPw,sE := Truncs ◦ XORPwE ,
where Truncs denotes the truncation operation where we drop the last t−s bits
of a t-bit string, where t ≥ s. In section 5, we prove that the XORPw,sE construc-
tion enjoys the same security bound in the multi-user setting than the XORPwE in
the single-user setting. Namely, for any number u of users, any positive integers
q, t, s such that q ≤ 2nw2(w+1) , s ≤ wn and any (u, q, t)−adversary D against the
mPRF security of XORPw,sE , there exists a (u, (w + 1)q, t′)−adversary against
the mPRP security of E such that
AdvmPRFXORPw
E
(D) ≤ AdvmPRPE (D′) +
w2q
2n ,
2 This also holds in the multi-user setting as long as the set of users is small enough.
8where t′ = O(t+ q · tXORPw,s), and tXORPw,s is an upper bound on the time
needed evaluate the XORPw,s· construction.
If we combine these two results, we get the following theorem which is the
main contribution of this work.
Theorem 1 Let u be the number of users. Let k, n, q, t be positive integers
such that n > 1 and w2(w + 1)q ≤ 2n/67 where w := dk/ne. Let E : {0, 1}k ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a block cipher. Let D be a (u, q, t)−adversary against
the ±mP˜RP security of TKS[E,XORPw,kE ]. Then there exist a (u, (w + 1)τ, t′)-
adversary against the mPRP security of E and a (τ, q, t′′)−adversary against
the ±mPRP security of E such that
Adv±mP˜RPTKS[E,XORPw,k
E
](D) ≤Adv
mPRP
E (D′) +Adv±mPRPE (D′′) +
w2q
2n ,
where τ = min(q, u·2n−1−blog2(w)c), t′ = O(t+q·(tXORPw,k+tE)), t′′ = t+O(q),
tE denotes an upper bound on the time needed to compute E and E−1 on any
input and tXORPw,k is an upper bound on the time needed evaluate the XORPw,k·
construction.
Remark 1 Under the assumption that E is secure as long as u, q, t  2n,
Theorem 1 implies that our construction results in a tweakable block cipher
that is also secure under the same constraints in the standard model, while it
still offers interesting performances. Namely, a change of tweak requires w + 1
encryptions and a rekeying of E, while encrypting/decrypting a block (without
changing the tweak) simply costs one call to E.
Remark 2 While it would seem natural to choose a block cipher using a n-bit
key, where n is the size of the block, this would only lead to birthday bound
security. Consider the following multi-user adversary D against such a block
cipher, due to Biham [6]:
– D chooses an arbitrary fixed message, encrypts it for about 2n/2 distinct
users using its encryption oracle;
– D chooses about 2n/2 keys and computes the encryption of this message
under the chosen keys;
– for each collision between the two sets of ciphertexts, D tests if the guessed
key is correct by encrypting a second message; if it is, D assumes it has
found the key of the corresponding user.
Such an adversary can recover at least one key with a high probability, while
only requiring about 2n/2 time and queries. Thus, for our scheme to be truly
secure up to 2n time and queries, it is necessary to chose a block cipher whose
key size is at least twice the block length.
3.2 A note on Optimality
Let u, k, n be three integers and let E, : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a block
cipher.
9In [31], Mennink defines optimal security as follows: E will be said optimally
secure if, for every single user adversary D allowed q queries and a computation
time t, one has
Adv±mPRPE (D) ≤
constE ·max(q, t)
min(2k, 2n) ,
where constE is a small constant depending on E. Optimal security for tweak-
able block ciphers is defined similarly. He investigates the possibility of building
a tweak-rekeyable cipher (i.e. a tweakable block cipher based on a block cipher,
where the value of the tweak influences the value of the key used for the
underlying block cipher) and proving its security in the standard model by
using generic standard-to-ideal transformations. He proves that, assuming that
the best possible security for a non-tweak-rekeyable tweakable block cipher
based on a block cipher is 2σn/(σ+1), then it is impossible to achieve optimal
security with such a proof technique. This result stems from the fact that
either the tweak has little influence over the value of the key used by the
underlying block cipher, in which case the construction shares the same bound
as non-tweak-rekeyable constructions, or the tweak has a great influence. In the
latter case, the underlying block cipher will be used with a lot of different keys,
and thus be vulnerable to a (related-key) key recovery attack. In our work,
we discuss the merit of shifting from the single-user scenario to the multi-user
scenario.
In order to better see the benefits of the multi-user setting, we are going to
choose a slightly different definition of optimal security by generalizing to the
multi-user setting the notion from [3, Section 3.6]. We are going to say that
the block cipher E is optimally secure if, for any adversary D allowed q queries
to at most u users and a computation time t, one has
Adv±mPRPE (D) ≤
cEut
2k +
c′Eq
2n ,
where cE and c′E are small constants. Optimally secure tweakable block ciphers
using the same key space and message space as E would be defined by the
exact same condition3.
Using Theorem 1, and assuming optimal security for E, for any adversary
D allowed q queries to at most u users and a computation time t, we have
Adv±mP˜RPTKS[E,XORPw,k
E
](D) ≤
cEut
′ + cEτt′′
2k +
(
w2 + c′E(w + 2)
)
q
2n ,
where τ = min(q, u·2n−1−blog2(w)c), t′ = O(t+q ·(tXORPw,k+tE)), t′′ = t+O(q),
tE denotes an upper bound on the time needed to compute E and E−1 on
any input and tXORPw,k is an upper bound on the time needed evaluate the
XORPw,k· construction. Hence one has
Adv±mP˜RPTKS[E,XORPw,k
E
](D) ≤
c˜Eut+ c˜′Euq + cEqt+ c˜′′Eq2
2k +
(
w2 + c′E(w + 2)
)
q
2n ,
3 Note that the first term involves the number u of users in order to capture Biham’s
multi-user key search attack.
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where c˜E , c˜′E and c˜′′E are small constants. Several remarks can then be done:
– in the single-user setting (u = 1), our construction would achieve the
same security bound as Minematsu’s construction (namely birthday bound
security with respect to the key size if we take the largest available tweak
space, or beyond the birthday bound security if we restrict the tweak space);
– in the case where k ≥ 2n,
– our construction achieves n bits of security;
– in the multi-user setting, and assuming that the adversary can access as
many users as it desires (u = q ≤ 2n), our construction actually achieves
optimal security (however this is not the case if u q).
This does not contradict the result from [31], and the issues raised in this
article are relevant and underline interesting questions:
– is the "real" security of a system closer to idealized-model security or
standard-model security?
– can generic standard-to-ideal reductions be avoided?
In this article, we stay in the standard model and show that, even if the security
loss from the rekeying of the underlying block cipher depending on the tweak
is unavoidable due to the looseness of Theorem 2, in the multi-user setting it
can be somewhat mitigated (depending on the power given to the adversary).
Indeed, a similar security loss becomes mandatory and has to be taken into
account in the notion of optimal security4.
4 The Security of the TKS Construction
One has the following result. It can be seen as the multi-user version of Theorem
3 from [33].
Theorem 2 Let u be the number of users. Let KE ,KF ,ME ,MF be non-empty
sets and let q, t be positive integers. Let F : KF ×MF → KE be a PRF and let
E : KE ×ME →ME be a block cipher. Let D be a (u, q, t)−adversary against
the ±mP˜RP security of TKS[E,F ]. Then there exist a (u, τ, t′)−adversary
D′ against the mPRF security of F and a (τ, q, t′′) adversary D′′ against the
±mPRP security of E such that
Adv±mP˜RPTKS[E,F ](D) ≤AdvmPRFF (D′) +Adv±mPRPE (D′′),
where τ = min(q, u · |MF |), t′ = O(t+ q · tE), t′′ = t+O(q), and tE denotes
an upper bound on the time needed to compute E and E−1 on any input.
Remark 3 Note that, if u = 1, then we can recover Theorem 3 from [33] by
applying the standard multi-user to single-user security reduction.
4 If we consider the multi-user setting, the multi-user key search attack [6] mitigates the
impact of the related-key attack from [31] as the number of distinct users grows to the
number of adversarial queries.
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Proof of Theorem 2. Let D be a (u, q, t)−adversary against the ±mP˜RP secu-
rity of TKS[E,F ]. Let us denote F ∗ the perfect PRF whose key space is simply
KF∗ = Func(MF ,KE), such that
∀(k, x) ∈ KF∗ ×MF , F ∗k (x) = k(x).
Then, by definition, one has
Adv±mP˜RPTKS[E,F ](D) =
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [f ←$ Func([u],KF ) : DTKS[E,F ]f(·) = 1]
− Pr
[
P˜ ←$ Perm([u]×MF ,ME) : DP˜ = 1
] ∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [f ←$ Func([u],KF ) : DTKS[E,F ]f(·) = 1]
− Pr
[
f ←$ Func([u],KF∗) : DTKS[E,F
∗]f(·) = 1
] ∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [f ←$ Func([u],KF∗) : DTKS[E,F∗]f(·) = 1]
− Pr
[
P˜ ←$ Perm([u]×MF ,ME) : DP˜ = 1
] ∣∣∣∣∣.
Then it is easy to see that there exists a (u, τ, t′)−adversary D′ against the
mPRF−security of F such that∣∣∣∣∣Pr [f ←$ Func([u],KF ) : DTKS[E,F ]f(·) = 1]
− Pr
[
f ←$ Func([u],KF∗) : DTKS[E,F
∗]f(·) = 1
] ∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ AdvmPRFF (D′), (1)
where t′ = O(t+ q · tE) and τ = min(q, u · |MF |). Indeed, D has to distinguish
between the multi-user tweakable permutations EFf(·)(·)(·) and EF∗f(·)(·)(·).
Since, when f ←$ Func([u],KF∗), F ∗f(·) is simply a uniformly random function
from Func([u] × MF ,KE), an equivalent description would be to say that
D has to distinguish between EFf(·)(·)(·), where f ←$ Func([u],KF ), and
ER(·,·)(·), where R←$ Func([u]×MF ,KE). Consequently, D′ will simply be
the distinguisher that runs D and answers its queries by applying E (keyed
with the answers given by its own oracle) and will output the same value as
D. Moreover, an adversary cannot use more than |MF | different tweaks for a
single user, which means that D′ will make at most min(q, u · |MF |) queries to
F .
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There also exists a (τ, q, t′′)−adversary D′′ against the ±mPRP−security
of E such that∣∣∣∣∣Pr [f ←$ Func([u],KF∗) : DTKS[E,F∗]f(·) = 1]
− Pr
[
P˜ ←$ Perm([u]×MF ,ME) : DP˜ = 1
] ∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Adv±mPRPE (D′′), (2)
where t′′ = t + O(q). This can be seen as follows. Let D′′ be the following
adversary against the ±mPRP security of E. D′′ runs D, answering D’s queries
using its own oracle and by mapping each (user,tweak) value to a different
user, and outputs the same value as D. In that case, the number of users
queried would be smaller than τ = min(q, u · |MF |). By definition, for each
(user,tweak) pair (ui, t), F ∗f(ui)(t) is a uniformly random secret value chosen at
the beginning of the experiment (with the random draw of f): the answers of
the TKS[E,F ∗]f(·) oracle thus follow the same distribution as the answers of a
±mPRP oracle for E. Moreover, D′′ does at most q queries in time at most
t+O(q).
The result follows by combining Eqs (1) and (2).
5 A security analysis of the XORP PRP-to-PRF conversion
method in the multi-user setting
5.1 Statement of the Result and Presentation of the Proof Strategy
For the remaining of this section, let us fix a non-zero number of users u and
three positive integers n, s, w such that s ≤ wn and a block cipher E with key
space KE and message space {0, 1}n. We are going to study the mPRF security
of the XORPw,sE construction and prove the following result.
Lemma 1 Let q, t be integers such that q ≤ 2n67w2(w+1) and let D be a (u, q, t)−
adversary against the mPRF security of XORPw,sE . There exists a (u, (w +
1)q, t′)−adversary against the mPRP security of E such that
AdvmPRFXORPw,s
E
(D) ≤ AdvmPRPE (D′) +
w2q
2n ,
where t′ = O(t + q · tXORPw,s) and tXORPw,s is an upper bound on the time
needed to evaluate the XORPw,s· construction.
Remark 4 This result is a slight generalization to the multi-user setting of a
theorem from [21].
The remaining of the section is devoted to the proof of lemma 1. Let
us denote E∗ the perfect block cipher, i.e. the block cipher with key space
KE∗ = Perm(n), where
∀(k, x) ∈ KE∗ × {0, 1}n, E∗k(x) = k(x).
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Let q, t be integers such that q ≤ 2n/67w2(w+1). We denote n′ = n−dlog2(w+
1)e. Let D be a (u, q, t)−adversary against the mPRF security of the XORPw,sE
construction. As usual, the first step of our proof is classical: we are going to
replace the block cipher E in the construction by the perfect block cipher E∗.
By definition, one has
AdvmPRFXORPw,s
E
(D) =
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [f ←$ Func([u],KE) : DXORPw,sE (f(·),·) = 1]
− Pr
[
R←$ Func([u]× {0, 1}n
′
, {0, 1}s) : DR = 1
] ∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [f ←$ Func([u],KE) : DXORPw,sE (f(·),·) = 1]
− Pr
[
f ←$ Func([u],KE∗) : DXORP
w,s
E∗ (f(·),·) = 1
] ∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣Pr [f ←$ Func([u],KE∗) : DXORPw,sE∗ (f(·),·) = 1]
− Pr
[
R←$ Func([u]× {0, 1}n
′
, {0, 1}s) : DR = 1
] ∣∣∣∣∣
≤AdvmPRPE (D′) +AdvmPRFXORPw,s
E∗
(D), (3)
where D′ is a (u, (w + 1)q, t′)−adversary D′ against the mPRP security of E
such that t′ = O(t+ q · tXORPw,s) and tXORPw,s is an upper bound on the time
needed to evaluate the XORPw,s· construction. Indeed, when f is uniformly
random in Func([u],KE∗), E∗f(·) is a uniformly random multi-user permutation
in Perm([u], n). Thus it is easy to see that∣∣∣∣∣Pr [f ←$ Func([u],KE) : DXORPw,sE (f(·),·) = 1]
− Pr
[
f ←$ Func([u],KE∗) : DXORP
w,s
E∗ (f(·),·) = 1
] ∣∣∣∣∣ = AdvmPRPE (D′),
where D′ is the adversary against the mPRP security of E that simply runs D,
outpuuts the same bit as D and answers D’s queries by using its own oracle
and by evaluating the XORP construction on the outputs.
We are now going to use the H−coefficients technique to prove that
AdvmPRFXORPw,s
E∗
(D) ≤ w
2q
2n .
As this is now a purely information-theoretical problem, we are going to assume
that D is computationally unbounded, and hence wlog deterministic.
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5.2 The H-coefficients technique.
We start by describing Patarin’s H-coefficients technique [38].
We summarize the interaction of D with its oracle in what is referred
to as the queries transcript τ of the attack. We are also going to provide
more information to the adversary. For each query, we are going to reveal the
full output of the XORP construction (i.e. before the truncation) in the real
world, and in the ideal world we will simply give him an equivalent number
of random bits. This can only improve the distinguisher’s advantage as this
additional information can simply be ignored. More precisely, τ contains all
triples (i, x, y) ∈ [u] × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}wn such that D made the direct query
(i, x) to the oracle and received answer y. Note that queries are recorded
in an unordered fashion. However, since the distinguisher is assumed to be
deterministic, there is a one-to-one mapping between this representation and
the raw transcript of the interaction of D with its oracle (see e.g. [8] for more
details). We also assume that D never makes useless queries and always makes
the maximal number of queries, thus |τ | = q.
We say that a queries transcript is attainable5 if there exists an oracle F
such that the interaction of D with F yields this transcript. Let us denote
Θ the set of attainable transcripts. In all the following, we denote Xre, resp.
Xid, the probability distribution of the transcript τ induced by the real world
(resp. by the ideal world). By extension, we use the same notation to denote a
random variable distributed according to each distribution. The main lemma
of the H−coefficients technique is the following one.
Lemma 2 ([38,8]) Fix a distinguisher D. Let Θ = ΘgoodunionsqΘbad be a partition
of the set of attainable transcripts. Assume that there exists ε1 ≥ 0 such that
for any τ ∈ Θgood, one has
Pr [Xre = τ ]
Pr [Xid = τ ]
≥ 1− ε1,
and that there exists ε2 such that
Pr [Xid ∈ Θbad] ≤ ε2.
Then Adv(D) ≤ ε1 + ε2.
5.3 Preliminary observations.
Let us fix an attainable transcript
τ = {(u1, x1, y1), . . . , (uq, xq, yq)}.
For any message x ∈ {0, 1}wn and for any i ∈ {1, . . . , w}, [x]i will be the unique
n-bit message such that x =
∣∣∣∣w
i=1[x]i.
5 That is with respect to D.
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In the ideal world, the oracle is a uniformly random multi-user function, so
that the probability of getting the attainable transcript τ is simply
Pr [Xid = τ ] =
1
2qwn .
In the real world, we want to evaluate the probability that a uniformly random
function f ∈ Func([u],Perm(n)) satisfies, for i = 1, . . . , q and j = 1, . . . , w,
f(ui)(xi||0)⊕ f(ui)(xi||j) = [yi]j .
In this case, we say that f is compatible with τ and this event will be denoted
f ∈ Comp(τ). Let m be the number of pairwise distinct users appearing
in τ . For i = 1, . . . , r, let τi be the transcript of the interaction of D with
permutation f(ui), for an arbitrary ordering of the users, and let qi = |τi|.
Then, one has q =
∑r
i=1 qi and τ =
⋃r
i=1 τi. Since f is uniformly random in
Func([u],Perm(n)), then the permutations f(ui) are uniformly random and
independent in Perm(n). Then, the event f ∈ Comp(τ) can be divided into r
independent events f(ui) ∈ Comp(τi) for i = 1, . . . , r. Thus, one has
Pr [Xre = τ ] =Pr [f ←$ Func([u],Perm(n)) : f ∈ Comp(τ)]
=Pr
[
f ←$ Func([u],Perm(n)) :
r⋂
i=1
f(ui) ∈ Comp(τi)
]
=
r∏
i=1
Pr [f ←$ Func([u],Perm(n)) : f(ui) ∈ Comp(τi)]
=
r∏
i=1
Pr [P ←$ Perm(n) : P ∈ Comp(τi)] . (4)
Let i ∈ {1 . . . , r}. We are now going to evaluate the probability that a uniformly
random permutation is compatible with τi = {(ui, x1, y1), . . . , (ui, xqi , yqi)}.
Let yi = (y1, . . . , yqi). For any permutation P ∈ Perm(n), let us denote P (τ)
the (w + 1)qi−tuple defined as follows:
P (τ) = (P (x1|0), . . . , P (x1|w), . . . , P (xqi |0) . . . , P (xqi |w)) .
We also denote by Λw(yi) the set of every (w + 1)q−tuple
P = (P0, . . . , P(w+1)qi−1) ∈ J (w+1)qn
such that 
P0 ⊕ P1 = [y1]1
...
P0 ⊕ Pw = [y1]w
...
P(w+1)(qi−1) ⊕ . . .⊕ P(w+1)qi−w = [yqi ]1
...
P(w+1)(qi−1) ⊕ . . .⊕ P(w+1)qi−1 = [yqi ]w.
(5)
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Note that the event P ∈ Comp(τi) is equivalent to P (τ) ∈ Λw(y). Thus, one
has
Pr [P ←$ Perm(n) : P ∈ Comp(τi)] =Pr [P ←$ Perm(n) : P (τ) ∈ Λw(y)]
=
∑
P∈Λw(yi)
Pr [P ←$ Perm(n) : P (τ) = P]
= |Λw(yi)|(2n)(w+1)qi
. (6)
Combining Eqs (4) and (6), one gets
Pr [Xre = τ ] =
r∏
i=1
|Λw(yi)|
(2n)(w+1)qi
.
Finally, one has
p(τ) := Pr [Xre = τ ]Pr [Xid = τ ]
=
r∏
i=1
2nwqi |Λw(yi)|
(2n)(w+1)qi
. (7)
Hence, to apply lemma 2, like in the single-user case, we are going to need to
compare, as precisely as possible, the quantities |Λw(yi)| and (2n)(w+1)qi/2nwqi .
In order to prove our result, we are going to rely on a combinatorial result
by Patarin, who has already studied a related construction in the single-user
setting in [39], and proven useful results in the context of the so-called Mirror
Theory.
5.4 An Introduction to Mirror Theory
Introduced by Patarin (see e.g. [37,41]), Mirror Theory refers to the analysis of
the number of solutions of systems of linear equalities and linear non-equalities
in finite groups. This analysis is closely related to the security of various
cryptographic constructions in the information theoretic model.
In this section, we are going to introduce the terminology of Mirror Theory
and state Patarin’s “Theorem Pi⊕Pj with any ξmax” [40], which is at the core
of our proof of Lemma 1.
Definition 1 ([40]) Let (A) be a set of linear equations Pi ⊕ Pj = λk, where
Pi, Pj ∈ {0, 1}n. If, by linear combination of the equations in (A), we cannot
generate an equation in only the λk variables, we will say that (A) has no circle
in P , or that the equations of (A) are linearly independent in P .
In such a system of linear equations, some variables will be related by the
fact that fixing the value of one such variable may in turn force the value of
another one. This is formalized in the notion of block.
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Definition 2 ([40]) We will say that two indices i and j are in the same block
if we can obtain an equation only involving Pi, Pj and λk variables by linear
combination of the equations in (A).
Definition 3 ([40]) We will denote by ξmax the maximum nomber of indices
that are in the same block.
With these definitions, we can now state Patarin’s “Theorem Pi ⊕ Pj with
any ξmax”.
Theorem 3 ([40]) Let (A) be a set of equations Pi⊕Pj = λk with α variables
such that:
1. We have no circle in P in the equations (A).
2. We have no more than ξmax indices in the same block.
3. By linearity from (A) we cannot generate an equation Pi = Pj with i 6= j.
Then, if (ξmax − 1)2α ≤ 2n67 , we have
2anhα(A) ≥ (2n)α
where hα(A) denotes the number of solutions of (A) that are also pairwise
distinct and a is the number of equations in (A).
With this theorem, we can now proceed with the proof of Lemma 1.
5.5 Proof of Lemma 1.
First, let us define the set Θbad of bad transcripts. A transcript
τ = {(u1, x1, y1), . . . , (uq, xq, yq)}
is said bad if one of these two conditions is fulfilled.
1. There exists i ∈ {1 . . . , q}, j ∈ {1, . . . , w} such that [yi]j = 0.
2. There exists i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . , w} such that j 6= j′ and [yi]j =
[yi]′j .
Note that these two conditions are required in order to satisfy condition 3.
from Theorem 3. We are now going to upper bound the probability to get a
bad transcript in the ideal world. In the ideal world, the distinguisher is simply
interacting with a uniformly random function. Thus, one has
Pr [Xid ∈ Θbad] ≤ wq2n +
w(w − 1)q
2n =
w2q
2n . (8)
We now have to lower bound the ratio p(τ). Recall that one has
p(τ) :=
r∏
i=1
2nwqi |Λw(yi)|
(2n)(w+1)qi
.
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Each single-user transcript τi translates to a Mirror system (Ai) similar to
Eqs (5). In order to lower bound the number of solutions to each system
(i.e. |Λw(yi)|), we will rely on Theorem 3. Note that, in our case, each query
translates to exactly one block of w equations and w + 1 variables. Hence, for
each system, we have ξmax = w + 1, a = wqi and α = (w + 1)qi.
The condition (ξmax−1)2α ≤ 2n67 from Theorem 3 becomes w2(w+1)qi ≤ 2
n
67
for i = 1 . . . ,m, which is satisfied since w2(w + 1)q ≤ 2n67 .
Moreover, if we look closely at system (5), we see that there can be no
circle in P (i.e. it is not possible using the equations to generate by linearity
an equation involving no Pi variable). Moreover, since τ is a good transcript,
we see that it is impossible to generate an equation of the type Pi = Pj . As
one has |Λw(yi)| = h(w+1)qi(Ai), Theorem 3 gives
p(τ) =
r∏
i=1
2nwqi |Λw(yi)|
(2n)(w+1)qi
=
r∏
i=1
2nwqih(w+1)qi(Ai)
(2n)(w+1)qi
≥1. (9)
Finally, if we combine Lemma 2 and Eqs (8) and (9), we get
AdvmPRFXORPw,s
E∗
(D) ≤ w
2q
2n ,
which ends the proof of Lemma 1.
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